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STATEMENT QF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Appellant seeks review of the directed verdict entered on 
November 3, 1995. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to § 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS QF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting a directed 
verdict for Defendant? The standard of appellate review: 
(a) The evidence must be examined in the light most favorable 
to the losing party and, if this examination provides a 
reasonable basis in the evidence and inferences to support 
judgment in favor of the losing party, a directed verdict must 
be reversed. 
(b) A directed verdict must be reversed unless, as a matter 
of law, reasonable minds could not differ on the facts. 
(c) Where there is any evidence that raises questions of 
fact, no matter how improbable, judgment as a matter of law 
must be reversed. 
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.
 f 905 P. 2d 297, 299 (Utah App. 
1995); Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Rec. Ass'n, 845 P.2d 242, 
243 (Utah 1992); Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Graystone Pinesr Inc. r 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982); Nay 
v. General Motors Corp.r 850 P.2d 1260, 1261 (Utah 1993); Anderson 
v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432, 434 (1973). 
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Plaintiff alleged breach of contract or warranty and tort theories 
against Defendant. (R. at 2-10 and 193-203.) Plaintiff argued 
against and objected to entry of a directed verdict. (R. at 716-
757. ) Plaintiff objected to the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Directed Verdict. (R. at 231-240. ) 
2. Whether there was evidence of Plaintiff's damages? The 
standard of appellate review and citation to the record showing the 
issue was preserved on appeal are the same as for paragraph 1. 
3. Whether there was evidence that Plaintiff reasonably 
relied on the negligent misrepresentation by Defendant? The 
standard of appellate review and citation to the record showing the 
issue was preserved on appeal are the same as for paragraph 1. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 50(a), Utah R. Civ. P., provides as follows: 
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the 
evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the 
event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved 
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had 
not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not 
granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all 
parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A 
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion 
for a directed verdict is effective without the assent of the 
jury. 
NATURE QF THE CASE 
In 1993, Plaintiff filed this action to recover the damages it 
sustained when seven computer components were destroyed as the 
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result of high temperatures during an air conditioning failure on 
December 25, 1991. Defendant provided all service and maintenance 
for Plaintiff's air conditioning systems, including the computer 
room system that operated twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. 
Defendant installed an automatic backup system to automatically 
prevent the loss of air conditioning in the computer room. 
In reliance on a conversation with Defendant, Plaintiff 
understood the backup system was operational on December 25 and, 
for the first time ever, did not require employees to continuously 
work in the computer room on Christmas. Plaintiff assigned 
employees to visit the computer room at hourly intervals. While 
the computer room was unattended, the air conditioning failed and 
the backup system did not automatically maintain air conditioning. 
More than seven computer components were destroyed by high 
temperatures. Defendant argued that Plaintiff knew that the auto 
backup project was incomplete and that Defendant never represented 
that the backup was fully operational. 
On August 7 and 8, 1995, Plaintiff presented its case-in-
chief. On the third day of trial, August 9, the trial court 
granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict before Defendant 
began its case-in-chief or any jury deliberations. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During 1991, Plaintiff provided health care management 
services to over a thousand customers. (R. at 442.) Russell 
Loudon was assigned direct responsibility for Plaintiff's computer 
room during 1991. (R. at 443.) Mr. Loudon was hired by one of 
Alta Health Strategies1 predecessor companies in 1982. (R. at 352-
353. ) Mr. Loudon started in the computer room as a graveyard shift 
operator, but within three and one-half years Mr. Loudon had been 
promoted to manager of the computer room. (R. at 352 and 354. ) 
Plaintiff's computer room was built at the same time that 
Plaintiff's building was constructed in approximately 1980. (R. at 
355-356 and 373.) Mr. Loudon ceased his employment with Plaintiff 
in August of 1993. (R. at 362 and 441.) 
Through 1991, Plaintiff obtained virtually all of its computer 
equipment from Unisys. (R. at 360 and 443.) Jim Bolinder, a 
Unisys service engineer, was primarily responsible for maintenance 
and upkeep of the computer systems and equipment. (R. at 357-358. ) 
Mr. Bolinder worked the graveyard shift, since it was the only time 
acceptable to take the computer system down for maintenance. (R. 
at 358.) Unisys' responsibilities were computer maintenance, 
repair, and if Plaintiff was adding equipment, Unisys would tell 
Plaintiff what to actually purchase from Unisys. (R. at 359.) The 
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Unisys field engineers would perform daily maintenance under a 
service contract between Plaintiff and Unisys. (R. at 359.) 
Plaintiff purchased increasing amounts of more sophisticated 
Unisys computer equipment as its business grew until, by 1991, 
Plaintiff had thousands of customer accounts on its computers. 
(R. at 355-356 and 361.) For many years through 1991, the Unisys 
computers operated twenty-four hours a day, fifty-two weeks a year. 
(R. at 356, 443 and 447.) Certain computer components were heat-
sensitive and, therefore, the air conditioning operated twenty-four 
hours a day, 365 days a year. (R. at 402. ) The target temperature 
for the computer room was a few degrees within 72 degrees. (R. 
444.) Downtime was very critical to Plaintiff. (R. 409.) Mr. 
Loudon prided himself on having the computers running at least 98% 
of the time. (R. at 379-380. ) One year the computers were up 
99.2% of the time. (R. at 380.) 
For many years prior to 1991, Plaintiff had assigned employees 
to work in the computer room twenty-four hours a day, fifty-two 
weeks a year. (R. at 427 and 444.) During 1991, Plaintiff 
experienced a number of computer failures that caused computer 
downtime. (R. at 367, 379, 402, and 428.) The most common 
computer failures were power outages that caused the loss of air 
conditioning (R. at 367, 379, 402-404, and 428.) Mr. Loudon and 
other managers decided to make the computers less vulnerable to air 
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conditioning failures. (R. at 379.) Plaintiff's goal was to 
minimize the downtime from power outages. (R. at 404. ) Nbne of 
Plaintiff's employees have experience, training or knowledge of air 
conditioning. (R. at 444 and 692-693. ) For the ten years up to 
1991, all air conditioning service and maintenance work for 
Plaintiff's computer room was performed by Defendant. (R. at 357, 
444, 647, and 693. ) While Defendant worked on the computer room 
air conditioning, Plaintiff would communicate with Defendant 
informally, the employees usually talked to each other in the hall 
or in one of the offices. (R. at 450. ) There were no special 
meetings or written records between the parties during the 
switchover project and the customary practice in the years up to 
1991 was that Defendant did not have meetings with Plaintiff or 
send documents back and forth. (R. at 451.) 
Mr. Loudon asked whether Defendant could install an automatic 
backup for the computer room air conditioning system. (R. at 377 
and 381-382.) Defendant represented that it could design and build 
an auto backup system. (R. at 377.) Mr. Loudon did not know how 
the auto backup system would work until after it failed in December 
of 1991. (R. at 384-385.) Defendant admitted that it knew that 
Plaintiff did not have any employees that were knowledgeable and 
experienced in air conditioning. (R. at 592. ) Defendant knew 
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Plaintiff was relying on Defendant for the automatic backup work. 
(R. at 591.) 
In 1991, Defendant prepared a Proposal-Contract for the air 
conditioning auto backup for the computer room. (Ex. 5.) The 
project to design and install an automatic switchover system was 
called the changeover. (Ex. 5.) Defendant agreed to charge $6,650 
for the changeover project. (Ex. 5.) The switchover project was 
started by Defendant near the end of 1991. (R. at 445. ) There was 
a second and larger project by Defendant to replace one of 
Plaintiff's air conditioning chillers underway at the end of 1991. 
(R. at 445 and 571-572.) Mr. Loudon was primarily responsible for 
the auto backup project performed by Defendant. (R. at 418. ) 
Prior to December 25, Mr. Loudon understood the switchover project 
was nearly finished by Defendant, because the project was supposed 
to have automatically switched over on December 25 and all that 
remained was installation of indicator lights. (R. at 437.) 
In the past, for every holiday, Plaintiff had always assigned 
computer operators to work, including Christmas day. (R. at 408 
and 447. ) Before December 25, Mr. Loudon asked his supervisor, 
Kent Broadhead, whether he could give the computer room operators 
time off for Christmas. (R. at 362, 408, and 447.) Mr. Broadhead 
had been the computer room manager before his promotion to 
director. (R. at 440.) After Plaintiff had experienced a number 
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of air conditioning failures, Mr. Broadhead had asked that an 
automatic switchover be installed to avoid any manual intervention 
should an air conditioning failure occur in the computer room. (R. 
at 445-446.) Mr. Broadhead agreed that computer operators could 
have time off on Christmas, if the switchover project allowed the 
computer room to be unmanned. Mr. Loudon confirmed this with 
Defendant, and agreed to monitor the computers at regular intervals 
throughout the day. (R. at 408, 447, and 449.) Mr. Broadhead met 
and confirmed with Mr. Loudon three separate times that the auto 
switchover was working before leaving the computer room unmanned on 
December 25. (R. at 451 and 508.) 
Defendant would talk to Mr. Loudon two to three times per week 
about the two air conditioning projects. (R. at 413. ) 
Nevertheless, Mr. Loudon did not really have a good understanding 
of the mechanism of the switchover. (R. at 413. ) Mr. Loudon did 
understand that the air conditioning would switch over if there was 
a problem. (R. at 408. ) The only instructions Mr. Loudon had from 
Defendant were that the changeover would switch over in the event 
of a failure and the operators only had to observe a panel with 
indicator lights, but this light panel would not be finished until 
later. (R. at 413-414, 423 and 437.) In the computer room 
conversation with Defendant, Mr. Loudon did not recall any mention 
of the mechanical or electrical mechanisms of the switchover. (R. 
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at 415. ) Mr. Loudon did not recall the computer room conversation, 
but he certainly understood that the changeover would switch over. 
(R. at 432.) 
Relying on his conversation with Defendant, Mr. Loudon gave 
the computer operators part of Christmas day off. (R. at 408, 412 
and 414. ) The employees were allowed to leave the computer room 
unmanned, but operators were required to visit the computer room at 
hourly intervals on December 25. (R. at 408 and 414. ) Mr. Loudon 
could not recall being told that the changeover would switch over 
until or unless there was a power hit, since upon mention of power 
hits Mr. Loudon would have felt uncomfortable not having the room 
staffed where power hits were the most common problem. (R. at 
427.) Defendant's employee could not recall whether he told 
Plaintiff that the switchover would work except for power failures. 
(R. at 579.) 
Mr. Loudon arrived at the computer room shortly before 4:00 
p.m. on December 25, 1991. (R. at 407.) Mr. Loudon discovered 
that there had been an air conditioning failure, since the room was 
at 95-96 degrees and the computer alarms, whistles and lights were 
activated. (R. at 367, 372, 407, and 422-423.) Mr. Loudon first 
called and requested emergency service from Defendant. (R. at 
409.) By the time Defendant arrived, the air conditioning was 
operating. (R. at 410.) 
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Jim Bolinder was dispatched by Unisys to the computer room on 
December 25 for fatal system errors from over-temperature problems. 
(R. at 614.) Mr. Bolinder's notes showed that the temperature in 
the computer room went up to 95 degrees. (R. at 617. ) At least 
five HDAs were having problems on December 25, but Mr. Bolinder got 
the computers up and running. (R. at 617-618.) On December 26, 
Mr. Bolinder found three HDAs in the computer room had crashed or 
had fatal errors. (R. at 618.) In Mr. Bolinder's opinion the 
high temperatures on December 25 caused the excessive number of HDA 
failures. (R. at 640-642.) 
Trial Exs. 2 and 3 were the customer service orders written up 
by the service engineers to specifically bill Plaintiff for service 
or repair. (R. at 614.) Mr. Bolinder wrote up Ex. 2 for the 
December 25 service call, since it was outside of the maintenance 
agreement between Plaintiff and Unisys. (R. at 615.) Plaintiff 
was charged $933.46 for the services performed by Mr. Bolinder on 
December 25. (R. at 616. ) Ex. 3 was the customer service order 
for a service call on December 29 for two HDAs that required 
maintenance. (R. at 616. ) The amount charged to Plaintiff for the 
work in Ex. 3 was $673.50. (R. at 616.) 
David English was employed by Plaintiff as the director of 
facilities, planning and support from 1989 to 1995. (R. at 644.) 
Mr. English signed trial Ex. 5, Defendant's Proposal-Contract, for 
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the auto switchover system project. (R. at 646. ) Mr. English 
supervised the air conditioning for Plaintiff's buildings, but not 
Plaintiff's computer room. (R. at 645.) Mr. Broadhead was in 
charge of the computer room in 1991. (R. at 645.) Mr. Loudon was 
in charge of making sure that the work on the switchover system 
described in Ex. 5 was completed. (R. at 647.) Mr. English 
regularly worked with Defendant's service employees assigned to 
work on Plaintiff's air conditioning. (R. at 648-649.) Mr. 
English did not have a detailed understanding of the switchover 
system. (R. at 651-652.) 
Before Mr. English left for a week of Christmas vacation, 
there was a systems failure and the changeover did not switch over. 
(R. at 653-654.) Mr. English asked one of Defendant's two service 
employees the reason that the changeover had not automatically 
switched over and the employee told Mr. English the switchover was 
95 to 99% finished, but Defendant was waiting for an electronic 
part. (R. at 654. ) Mr. English had the discussion with 
Defendant's employee in the hall right outside Mr. Broadhead's 
office. (R. at 654. ) Mr. Broadhead was in a meeting at the time 
of the discussion. (R. at 654. ) Mr. English said "are you waiting 
to see Kent [Broadhead], or do you want me to go in with you to 
talk to Kent?" (R. at 654. ) The employee said he would stay and 
talk to Mr. Broadhead and, therefore, Mr. English left. (R. at 
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654. ) Mr. Broadhead was never told by Defendant before December 25 
that the auto switchover was not working. (R. at 450-451 and 461-
462. ) 
Mark Bryner has been an electrical and mechanical engineer for 
nearly fifty years. (R. at 664-666.) Mr. Bryner reviewed all 
available drawings and diagrams and investigated Plaintiff's air 
conditioning, including the auto switchover system. (R. at 670.) 
Mr. Bryner explained that one of the two main parts of the auto 
switchover was the restart element. (R. at 681.) The restart was 
a push button before 1992, but after 1992 the restart was automatic 
once Defendant merely connected two wires or made a "jumper." (R. 
at 682-683. ) There was no mechanical or electrical engineering 
reason to wait to make the restart automatic; it could have been 
done on the first day of the project. (R. 685. ) The old and new 
indicator-light panels were not necessary for the auto restart. (R. 
686.) The indicator panel had nothing to do with either the 
restart or changeover parts of the switchover system. (R. at 691.) 
Dale Brown was the Unisys employee responsible for 
Plaintiff's sales account. (R. at 523-524.) Mr. Brown was 
involved in the replacement of Unisys computer equipment after 
Christmas 1991. (R. at 528.) Unisys head disk assemblies ("HDAs") 
were components of Plaintiff's computer system. (R. at 526.) An 
HDA is an assembly of aluminum platters that store information that 
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has been processed and generated by the computer. (R. at 388 and 
459.) An HDA is not generically different from a disk drive. (R. 
at 526.) The Unisys HDAs in Plaintiff's computer system were not 
designed to operate where temperatures exceeded 90 degrees or 
temperatures increased by more than five degrees per hour. (R. at 
621-622. ) Within one day, three HDAs had crashed from high 
temperatures. (R. at 428.) Seven to nine HDAs were damaged and 
replaced by Unisys within one month of December 25. (R. at 459, 
508, and 619-620.) Unisys repaired some of the HDAs. (R. at 529.) 
The loss of air conditioning on December 25 caused excessive 
temperatures that damaged HDAs and the HDAs had to be replaced. 
(R. at 400.) 
Under the maintenance contract between Plaintiff and Unisys, 
if an HDA failed and was damaged, within the terms of the 
agreement, Unisys replaced the HDA at its cost. (R. at 398 and 
470. ) There was really no difference between the service agreement 
and a warranty agreement. (R. at 553. ) Unisys had replaced HDAs 
that failed during the months preceding December 25, 1991 free-of-
charge each and every time. (R. at 532 and 553.) Unisys replaced 
two of the nine damaged HDAS at its own expense or under warranty. 
(R. at 460 and 620. ) The reason Unisys replaced two of the damaged 
HDAs at its own expense or under warranty was that any HDAs that 
had not logged any errors in the thirty days before December 25 
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would have been damaged by heat* (R. at 460.) Only two HDAs had 
logged errors before December 25 that were replaced by Unisys at 
its own expense. (R. at 460.) 
Of the approximately 150-200 HDAs in the Unisys computer room 
on December 25, one-half to two-thirds were the middle-aged model, 
No. 9494-24. (R. at 531, 533, and 613.) There were approximately 
twenty-four of the newest HDA model No. 9730. (R. at 535, 538, and 
613.) For many years, Plaintiff had continually purchased and 
installed the newest and most advanced models of computer equipment 
from Unisys. (R. at 360-361 and 525.) Plaintiff tried to stay on 
the leading edge of computer equipment and, when Mr. Loudon was 
terminated, the newest Unisys computer used by Plaintiff was one of 
only sixteen in the world. (R. 361.) Plaintiff would be one of 
the first to buy new Unisys HDAs as the latest version came out. 
(R. at 361 and 527.) 
The middle-aged HDAs, No. 9494-24, were larger, slower, and 
more expensive than the newest model 9730 HDA. (R. at 525 and 534-
535.) The seven 9494-24 HDAs damaged on December 25 were not 
replaced with identical 9494-24 HDAs. (R. at 459.) The two 9494-
24 HDAs replaced free-of-charge by Unisys were replaced with 
identical new 9494-24 HDAs. (R. at 620.) Plaintiff replaced the 
seven 9494-24 HDAs with the comparable space on the newest model 
HDA. (R. at 459.) The 9730 HDA was roughly half as expensive as 
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the older 9494-24. (R. at 535. ) Plaintiff saved considerable 
expense by purchasing the five smaller, faster, and cheaper No. 
9730 HDAs to replace the seven failed 9494-24 HDAs not replaced 
free-of-charge by Unisys. (R. at 529, 531 and 534-535.) Mr. Brown 
was aware of the decision by Unisys not to pay for replacement of 
the five HDAs following Christmas 1991. (R. at 530.) Unisys did 
charge Plaintiff for the HDAs damaged on December 25, but Mr. Brown 
did not know what happened to the HDAs that were removed. (R. at 
555. ) 
Mr. Brown received two orders from Mr. Broadhead for 9730 or 
9613 HDAs within one week of each other. (R. at 536.) Plaintiff 
ordered replacement equipment from Mr. Brown that would have been 
delivered within thirty days. (R. at 557) Trial Ex. 7 was an order 
for five HDAs dated January 16, 1992. (R. at 536.) Ex. 7 was for 
five of the newest model HDAs to replace the middle-aged HDAs that 
were deemed unrepairable after the Christmas air conditioning 
failure. (R. at 537. ) The unit price for the replacement HDAs was 
$22,706. (R. at 539.) Plaintiff's discount price for each of the 
five HDAs was $19,300. (R. at 539.) Mr. Brown did not recall any 
unusual price considerations given to Plaintiff to buy the newest 
model. (R. at 557-558.) Mr. Brown's only price for the 9730 HDAs 
was $19,300. (R. at 547.) The total order at the discount price 
in Ex. 7 was $96,300. (R. at 539.) 
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Trial Ex. 8 was an order for two HDAs dated January 21, 1992. 
(R. at 540.) Ex. 8 was for two of the newest model HDAs. (R. at 
540.) The discount price was $19,300 per HDA and the total price 
for the two HDAs was $38,600. (R. at 540.) Both orders were 
shipped to Plaintiff. (R. at 539-540) It took seven of the newest 
model HDAs to replace the five failed middle-aged HDAs. (R. at 
542.) Plaintiff's approximate cost to replace the seven damaged 
HDAs with the five newest models was $119,000. (R. at 460-461.) 
Mr. Brown approved the decision to charge Plaintiff for 
transportation, but not labor and installation. (R. at 530-531 and 
547. ) 
Trial Ex. 6 was a letter dated December 26, 1991, from Unisys 
to Plaintiff. (R. at 543.) In Ex. 6, Unisys described that on 
December 25 the customer service engineer noted that the 
temperature in the computer had reached 95 degrees. (Ex. 6.) 
Unisys understood that these extreme environmental conditions were 
due to an air conditioning malfunction in the computer room. (Ex. 
6. ) Unisys explained that hardware failures were not instantaneous 
from environmental shock, but already three 9494-24 HDAs had 
failed. (Ex. 6.) Unisys expressly informed Plaintiff that because 
the failure was environmental and not within the control of Unisys 
"the repair or replacement of the damaged hardware is beyond the 
scope of your Unisys Maintenance Agreement." (Ex. 6.) "The cost 
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to replace or repair the units will be the responsibility of Alta 
Health." (Ex. 6.) The HDA order in Exs. 6, 7, and 8 was the only 
event where Unisys has charged any customer for the replacement of 
HDAs. (R. at 561. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court failed to examine Plaintiff's evidence and 
the inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiff. The directed verdict cannot be sustained where there is 
any evidence that raises a question of material fact, no matter how 
improbable, the evidence may appear. Plaintiff presented 
testimonial and documentary evidence of its damages and the 
reasonableness of its reliance on Defendant's negligent 
misrepresentation. 
2. Plaintiff's evidence of damages was not speculative. 
Plaintiff proved that nine heat-damaged computer components were 
replaced with seven new-model components at a discount price of 
$134,900.00. Installation of the seven new-model components saved 
Plaintiff at least $100,000.00 from the cost of replacement of the 
destroyed components with the same middle-aged models. Thus, 
Plaintiff presented a rational basis to allow the jury to make a 
reasonable estimate of Plaintiff's damages. Moreover, Plaintif was 
not required to prove payment and would be entitled to nominal 
damages regardless of any insufficient proof of actual damages. 
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3. The testimony by Plaintiff's employees that Defendant 
negligently misrepresented that the air conditioning system was 
fully automatic was not contradicted by Defendant at trial. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Defendant's representation was reasonably 
foreseeable, since Defendant knew that Plaintiff had no air 
conditioning expertise, Defendant had performed all air 
conditioning service and maintenance for ten years, communication 
between the parties had always been informal, and Defendant had to 
be accurate in statements to Defendant as a commercial air 
conditioning contractor. Whether Plaintiff's reliance was 
reasonable is a prototypical jury question. 
ARGUMENT I 
WHEN THE EVIDENCE AND ALL INFERENCES ARE EXAMINED, 
IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF, A QUESTION 
OF FACT, EVEN IF IMPROBABLE, WAS RAISED BY PLAINTIFF 
CONCERNING DAMAGES AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The trial court prevented any issues from going to the jury 
and entered judgment as a matter of law. A directed verdict should 
be used cautiously and sparingly. A well-recognized alternative 
for a trial court concerned with the sufficiency of a party's 
evidence of damages is to allow the case to go to the jury, but 
grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("J.N.O.V.") if the 
jury awards speculative or uncertain damages. 
The most recent decision involving entry of a directed verdict 
is Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 905 P. 2d at 297. The 
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plaintiff claimed permanent injuries from an elevator that trapped 
plaintiff and allegedly threw the plaintiff up and down for forty 
minutes. The supreme court reversed the entry of the directed 
verdict in favor of the building owner. The plaintiff's claim 
against the owner was based on failure to repair. Hence, plaintiff 
had the burden to show that the owner knew or should have known 
that a dangerous condition existed and the owner had sufficient 
time to take corrective action. Id. at 300. The supreme court 
restated the appellate standard of review for a directed verdict: 
On appeal from a directed verdict, "we must examine the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and 
if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment 
in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be 
sustained." Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Rec. Ass'nr 845 
P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Graystone Pinesf 652 P.2d 
at 898). Where there is any evidence that raises a question 
of material fact, no matter how improbable the evidence may 
appear, judgment as a matter of law is improper. See Hill v. 
Seattle First Nat'l Bankr 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). 
IxL, at 299. 
Plaintiff's evidence of prior elevator problems consisted of 
the testimony of two employees of the elevator company, several 
persons who had been trapped in the elevator before plaintiff's 
injury, and copies of service records that showed numerous 
malfunctions. The court, without making any conclusion as to the 
weight and veracity of the evidence, concluded that the evidence 
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was sufficient to raise a genuine question of material fact when 
viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Id, at 300. 
Similarly, in Nay v. General Motors Corp.r 850 P.2d at 1260, 
the court reversed a directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer 
of an allegedly defective vehicle. The testimony of the 
plaintiffs' experts, when all facts and inferences from the facts 
were viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, established 
a specific theory of the defect and causation of the vehicle crash. 
"We refuse to prevent these issues from going to the jury when, as 
here, there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could 
infer causation." Id. at 1264 (citing Butterfield v. Okubor 831 
P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992)). 
In this case, when the evidence and all inferences from the 
evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the 
testimony and exhibits prove that Plaintiff was damaged and that 
Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendant's misrepresentation that 
the auto switchover was operable. 
For example, in the findings of fact, the trial court conceded 
that the computer components had to be replaced and that these 
components were damaged by high temperatures on December 25. Thus, 
where there was any evidence presented by Plaintiff on the amount 
of damages, no matter how improbable the evidence may appear, 
Plaintiff was entitled to have the jury consider Plaintiff's claims 
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for damages. Similarly, upon admission of any evidence of the 
reasonableness of Plaintiff's reliance on Defendant's 
misrepresentation that the switchover was automatic, no matter how 
improbable the evidence appeared, Plaintiff was entitled to go to 
the jury. Defendant knew that Plaintiff had no experience in air 
conditioning and, for ten years, had completely relied on Defendant 
for all air conditioning service and maintenance. For ten years 
the parties communicated informally with each other in the hall or 
offices without special meetings or transmission of documents back 
and forth. Mr. Loudon relied on the conversation that the auto 
switchover system was working on December 25. Defendant's employee 
knew, one week before Christmas, that Plaintiff understood the auto 
switchover was fully operational, but Defendant did not take 
precautions or make efforts to communicate the progress of the auto 
switchover system. Indeed, Defendant's employee never advised 
Plaintiff that the switchover was partially inoperable. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NOT OFFERED ANY 
EVIDENCE IN ALLOWING A REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF DAMAGES 
Plaintiff proved its damages with reasonable certainty and 
with sufficient evidence to ensure that the jury would not have to 
resort to speculation. The evidence showed the amount of damages 
and that Plaintiff's damages were caused by Defendant. Plaintiff 
is entitled to recover full compensation for the losses it 
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incurred. The trial court erred when it concluded as a matter of 
law that plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence for a 
jury to determine damages. 
In Price-Orem v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnellf 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 
App. 1989), the defendant objected to admission of an appraisal 
that used estimated income, not actual income. Defendant claimed 
plaintiff's evidence of income was insufficient to support the jury 
verdict of damages. The court held that the estimated income 
"evidence was not too speculative to support the damage award." 
Id. at 479. 
The court described the requisite proof to recover damages: 
The objective in rendering an award of damages is to award the 
injured party full compensation for actual losses incurred, 
see Henderson v. For-Shor Co.f 757 P.2d 465, 469 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), by evaluating any loss "suffered by the most 
direct, practical and accurate method that can be employed." 
Even Odds. Inc. v. Nielsonr 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d 709, 711 
(1968). It is well settled that, although the plaintiff has 
the burden of proving the fact, causation, and amount of 
damages, he need only do so with reasonable certainty rather 
than with absolute precision. Canyon Country Store, 781 P.2d 
at 418; Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co.
 r 722 P. 2d 773, 774 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam); Anderson v. Bauer. 681 P. 2d 1316, 1323-25 
(Wyo. 1984). "[A]lthough damages may not be determined by 
speculation or guesswork, evidence allowing a just and 
reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data is 
sufficient." National Steel Co. v. Great Lakes Towing Co.
 r 
574 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1978). 
Id. at 478. 
The court concluded that the amount of damages may be based on 
mere approximations, since "the level of certainty required to 
22 
establish the amount of loss is generally lower than that required 
to establish the fact of loss...." Id. at 479 (citing Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 (Utah App. 1989)); see also Broadway 
Realty & Trust, Inc. v. Gouldf 136 Ariz. 236, 665 P.2d 580, 582 
(Ariz. App. 1983) (once the right to damages was established, 
uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude recovery). 
The supreme court reached a similar result in Bastian v. Kingr 
661 P. 2d 953 (Utah 1983). The defendant contended that the damages 
from defendantf s trespassing cattle were so speculative that there 
was no rational basis in the evidence to support an award of $2,966 
to plaintiff for damaged crops. The case was remanded for further 
findings, since the court was unable to determine how the trial 
court calculated the value of the destroyed crops. Id. at 957. 
The supreme court ruled that speculative damages would be reversed, 
but the general rule was that "some degree of uncertainty in the 
evidence of damages will not suffice to relieve a defendant from 
recompensing a wronged plaintiff." Id. at 956. The court 
concluded as follows: 
As long as there is some rational basis for a damage award, it 
is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty. 
Winsness v, M.J. Conoco Distributors, Utah, 593 P. 2d 1303 
(1979). Where there is evidence of the fact of damage, a 
defendant may not escape liability because the amount cannot 
be proved with precision. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Plaintiff proved the fact, causation, and amount of damages by 
the most direct, practical, and accurate method. Plaintiff 
established the fact of loss through the testimony of a number of 
witnesses and exhibits. First, the undisputed testimony of the 
responsible Unisys engineer, corroborated by Mr. Loudon, was that 
the high temperatures on December 25 caused the damage to the 
middle-aged HDAs. Second, the testimony of the employees of Unisys 
and Plaintiff, including written service orders, shows that nine 
heat-damaged HDAs were replaced with seven of the newest-model HDA. 
All witnesses agreed that the replacement HDAs were shipped to 
Plaintiff. Indeed, the trial court's findings of fact concede that 
HDAs had to be replaced after high-heat damage. Finally, there can 
be no argument that Plaintiff was charged for service on HDAs 
damaged by heat and that the charges were outside the parties? 
maintenance agreement. 
Disputed evidence concerning the amount of Plaintiff's loss is 
part of the findings of fact. The trial court found no evidence 
that $19,300 per HDA charged by Unisys was a reasonable price, that 
price considerations were unspecified, and that there was no 
evidence of the fair market value of the nine middle-aged HDAs 
damaged by heat. However, these findings involving the amount of 
damages are subjected to a lower standard of proof. Approximations 
based on relevant data are allowed as long as the proof of the 
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amount does not amount to speculation or guesswork. Plaintiff's 
proof of damages did not amount to speculation or guesswork. The 
opinions of Plaintiff's damages were just and reasonable estimates 
based on relevant data. 
There was no dispute that Plaintiff was charged $1,606.96 in 
two Unisys customer service orders for service on heat-damaged 
HDAs. These service charges were not free-of-charge or under 
warranty, since the work was outside the parties' maintenance 
agreement. Plaintiff received a discount price on each new-model 
HDA that was $3,400 less expensive than the regular unit price. In 
addition, the installation of the newest-model HDA saved an 
enormous sum in replacement costs. The newest-model HDA was 
roughly one-half as expensive as the middle-aged HDAs destroyed by 
high temperatures. Thus, replacement of the destroyed HDAs with 
the newest-model HDAs saved Plaintiff at least $100,000. 
The two orders by Plaintiff for seven new-model HDAs showed 
that Unisys charged Plaintiff $134,900 for replacement HDAs at the 
discount price. Unisys shipped the orders to Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff was responsible for transportation expenses. Unisys 
employees testified that the discount price was the only price 
Unisys had for the newest-model HDAs. Unisys employees testified 
there were no other price considerations given to Plaintiff. 
Unisys replaced two other destroyed HDAs at its own expense. 
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Unisys had replaced all HDAs that failed in the years before 1992. 
The seven new-model HDAs were not replaced by Unisys free-of-charge 
or under warranty. Unisys sent Plaintiff a written explanation of 
why Unisys did and, for the first time, required Plaintiff to pay 
for the damaged components. Unisys stated that the high-heat 
destruction was not within the control of Unisys and the damage was 
beyond the scope of the maintenance agreement. Consequently, 
replacement of the failed equipment was the sole responsibility of 
Plaintiff. The December 25 air conditioning failure was the only 
event where Unisys charged any customer for replacement HDAs. 
Plaintiff had to replace HDAs after Plaintiff's wrongful and 
negligent conduct caused the computer room to be unmanned during an 
air conditioning failure. The undisputed evidence that Plaintiff 
replaced the destroyed HDAs is sufficient to subject Defendant to 
liability regardless of any imprecision concerning the amount of 
damages. Plaintiff is entitled to seek full compensation from the 
jury for actual losses shown with just and reasonable estimates. 
Plaintiff was entitled to seek nominal damages under its 
breach of contract claims regardless of whether it proved actual 
damages. Plaintiff sought to recover damages for Defendant's 
breach of contract or warranty and for negligent misrepresentation. 
In the event Plaintiff failed to prove actual damages, Plaintiff 
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was entitled to seek nominal damages from Defendant under its 
breach of contract or warranty claims. 
In Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, Inc.
 f 754 P. 2d 940 
(Utah 1988), the tenant breached a commercial lease. The trial 
court awarded the landlord damages for the lost rent during the 
fifteen months the premises were vacant. On appeal, the court held 
that the premises had been relet at a rate double defendant's rent 
and, under the terms of the lease, defendant's liability was zero. 
"However, nominal damages are recoverable upon a breach of contract 
if no actual damages resulted from the breach." Id. at 942 (citing 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 
(Utah 1982) ); see also Snyderville Trgtnsp. Co. v. Christiansen, 609 
P.2d 939, 943 (Utah 1980) (juries may award nominal damages if 
plaintiff fails to prove damages). 
Assuming that Plaintiff failed to prove actual damages, the 
claims for breach of contract or warranty would entitle Plaintiff 
to seek nominal damages from Defendant. Hence, the alleged failure 
to prove damages is not a proper ground for dismissal of a case by 
directed verdict. Of course, the charges for two service calls by 
Unisys to repair failed equipment proved actual damages of at least 
$1,606.96. In addition, the trial court's findings of fact 
expressly concede that five to seven HDAs required replacement from 
the high temperatures. Plaintiff was charged for two orders of 
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replacement HDAs shipped by Unisys to Plaintiff in the total sum of 
$134,900. For all prior HDA failures, Unisys had always replaced 
the HDAs free-of-charge. However, Unisys refused to pay for 
replacement of the HDAs destroyed by high heat on December 25. 
One of the trial court's findings of fact, No. 11, provides 
that Plaintiff produced no evidence establishing that Plaintiff 
ever paid for the replacement HDAs. Plaintiff is not required to 
prove payment to recover damages. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even 
have to buy replacement HDAs to recover damages, so long as 
Plaintiff does not fail to mitigate its damages. Failure to 
mitigate cannot be an issue in this case, since Plaintiff saved 
$100,000 by purchasing new-model HDAs. Plaintiff is only required 
to prove the fact that a loss occurred as a result of Defendant!s 
wrongdoing and the amount of the loss. Additionally, there are no 
Utah decisions that make proof of payment a requisite element of 
damages in a breach of contract or warranty case. 
In Barilla v. Gunn Buick-Cadillac-GMCr Inc.f 139 Misc.2d 496, 
528 N.Y.S.2d 273 (City Ct. 1988), the court ruled that the 
plaintiff may recover the costs to repair a defective vehicle from 
the dealer that sold the used car under a statutory warranty of 
serviceability. The plaintiff's repair costs were $1,075.87, since 
"plaintiff was and is liable to pay that amount although she has 
apparently not yet done so." Id. at 280. The court was unaware 
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"of any requirement that prior to recovering a judgment, a 
plaintiff must actually pay the bills that are the subject of the 
lawsuit." Id. "Indeed persons, sometimes indigent, frequently 
recover awards for past and even future anticipated expenses which 
they have not paid and sometimes cannot pay, and they recover their 
j udgment." Id. 
In Coe v. Esaur 377 P.2d 815 (Okl. 1963), a service station 
owner-operator destroyed plaintiff's automobile engine by 
installation of a faulty oil-filter gasket. The proper measure of 
damage for defendant's negligence was the cost of repair. However, 
the plaintiff traded in the car with the damaged motor when he 
acquired another vehicle. Plaintiff's car was not repaired and the 
court held that it was "'not a condition precedent to recover for 
items of damage for repairs that plaintiff should have actually 
expended the sums of incurred liability therefor.'" Id. at 820-21 
(quoting Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Quailsr 120 Okl. 49, 250 P. 774 
(1925)). 
Similarly, in Hughes v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.r Inc.r 485 So. 
2d 642 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986), the trial court awarded plaintiff 
damages for mental suffering and repair costs for her car from 
burning debris dropped by a transformer that exploded. Defendant 
argued that the plaintiff must first repair her# car before she was 
entitled to recover a damage award. Id. at 643. The court held 
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that "[a]n estimate of the cost of repair will support an award of 
damages; it is not necessary that the damaged property be actually 
repaired." Id. (citations omitted). 
There are no Utah cases that make proof of payment a requisite 
element of damages in a tort action. Of course, the custom and 
practice in personal injury cases is to offer evidence of all 
medical bills as proof of the amount of special damages. In 
personal injury actions, when medical bills have been paid, the 
jury is not advised of payment as required by the collateral source 
rule. DuBois v. Nyer 584 P. 2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978). Generally, no 
evidence that medical bills are paid or unpaid is ever offered at 
trial by the parties. Of course, the amount paid may be some 
evidence of the reasonable value of medical expenses. Lawson v. 
Safeway, Inc.r 878 P.2d 127, 131 (Colo. App. 1994). 
Plaintiff was not required to offer evidence it paid Unisys 
for the replacement HDAs to prove the fact of loss or amount of 
damages. Whether or not Unisys has yet been paid makes not 
difference in Plaintiff's right to recover damages from Defendant. 
Plaintiff replaced nine HDAs, but the burden of proving damages did 
not prescribe that Plaintiff even replaced the damaged equipment. 
Nor did Plaintiff have to offer testimonial or documentary evidence 
of payment, including canceled checks, receipts, or other bank 
records to prove payment. In the event Unisys did not obtain 
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payment for the HDAs it shipped and installed for Plaintiff, for 
whatever reason, Plaintiff should not be precluded from recovery of 
damages caused by Defendant. 
ARGUMENT III 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF REASONABLY RELIED ON 
DEFENDANT'S MISREPRESENTATION WAS A 
PROTOTYPICAL QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY 
The trial court's other erroneous conclusion of law was that 
Plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to allow the jury 
to find that the Plaintiff had "reasonably relied" upon Defendant's 
negligent misrepresentation. There is no dispute that Defendant 
made a misrepresentation to Plaintiff. All of Plaintiff's 
employees testified that Defendant represented to Plaintiff that 
the auto switchover was working on December 25. By contrast, 
Defendant's responsible employee could not recall if he represented 
to Plaintiff that the auto switchover was completely operable. 
Whether Plaintiff's reliance on Defendant's misrepresentation was 
reasonable is question of fact for a jury. 
In Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnellf 713 P.2d 
55 (Utah 1986), the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's 
claim against the engineering firm that had negligently staked the 
shopping center developed by plaintiff. The doctrine of negligent 
misrepresentation was described as follows: 
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[T]he tort ... provides that a party injured by reasonable 
reliance upon a second party's careless or negligent 
misrepresentation of a material fact may recover damages 
resulting from that injury when the second party had a 
pecuniary interest in the transaction, was in a superior 
position to know material facts, and should have reasonably 
foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely upon the 
fact. 
Id. at 59 (citations omitted). 
Defendant was hired to survey and stake the property and "was 
bound to do so with that degree of care and skill expected of 
licensed surveyors and/or engineers." Id. The professional 
expertise of the defendant entitled others to "reasonably rely" 
upon the project engineer's information. Id. at 59-60. Plaintiff 
"as the owner of the property for whose benefit the shopping center 
was being constructed, was clearly a party whose justifiable 
reliance upon the accuracy of the survey might be reasonably 
foreseen." Id. at 60. 
Similarly, reversal of Plaintiff's directed verdict is 
mandated in this case. Defendant was bound to perform the 
switchover project with the degree of care and skill expected of a 
commercial air conditioning contractor. Defendant's ten years of 
performance of all Plaintiff's air conditioning service and 
maintenance and Defendant's professional expertise entitled 
Plaintiff to reasonably rely on Defendant's statements concerning 
the switchover project. Defendant knew Plaintiff had no experience 
in air conditioning and Plaintiff, as the owner, was clearly a 
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party whose justifiable reliance upon the rirouracy of statements 
" ' •»• /as working was reasonably foreseeable. 
: '* recent decision, the court further interpreted the 
element reasonable reliance Maack v. Resource Design & 
Constr.
 r Inc. r \r>n 1QQ4). The plaintiffs 
appealed the dismissal of their claims against the seller's real 
estate agent, Kesselring, who had represented that til :ie 11 esi dence 
purchased by plciintiiis had a one-year builder's warranty The 
court relied 011 the Price-Orem factors to find that Kesselringfs 
statement to plaintiffs was a misrepresentation, Kesselri ng had a 
peon mar y nil o 1 es t • 11 11 u - transaction, and Kesselring was in a 
superior position to know material facts. Id. at 576. "The key 
question, however, is whether the Maacks * reliance 01 1 Kessel 1: I ng's 
rai srepresentat i 01» wau reasonable." Id. (emphasis in original). 
The court of appeals noted that the supreme court has only 
required proof of reasonable reliance, not diligi 
elemen . .srepresentation. Id. at ^ 7 7 (citing Price-
Oremr 713 P. 2d at 59). The court explained that in Schuhman v. 
Green River Motel. 835 P.2d 992 (Utah App. 1992), 
appeals had criticized the requirement of due diligence i: 
negligent misrepresentation claim, since "the supreme court had 
required only reasonable reliance." Id. at D// n. 5. The court 
conceded tha t: (in le diligence may be a higher standard of proof than 
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reasonable reliance. Id. "However, they both impose some standard 
of care on one claiming to be a victim of misrepresentation." Id. 
The court held that to bring a successful negligent 
misrepresentation claim plaintiffs must demonstrate that their 
"reliance on Kesselring's statement without some further 
investigation was reasonable under the circumstances." Id. at 577. 
The court affirmed that plaintiffs1 negligent 
misrepresentation cause was properly dismissed by summary judgment. 
Id. The court concluded that plaintiffs did not reasonably rely on 
the Kesselring's statement where plaintiffs failed to ask the scope 
of coverage under the warranty, did not review the warranty, did 
not refer to the warranty in the purchase agreement, did not 
inquire as to the expiration date, and plaintiff was an experienced 
attorney who should have known the terms of an "as is" sale. Id. 
In this case, Plaintiff had no employees with experience or 
knowledge of air conditioning. Defendant had a strong pecuniary 
interest in the switchover project and was in a position where it 
had exclusive knowledge concerning the status and nature of the 
work. Proof of due diligence was unnecessary for Plaintiff to 
recover damages. Plaintiff must merely prove that Mr. Loudon's 
reliance on Defendant's representation that the auto switchover was 
operable was reasonable and required no further investigation. Mr. 
Loudon relied on Defendant's misrepresentation that the switchover 
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was operational. Plaintiff's reliance, without further 
invest igat i.on ' hw i easonable where Plaintiff had relied on 
informal conversations with Defendant during the preceding ten 
years of air conditioning service and maintenance, Adda tionally, 
N . lish J r lves tigated the switchover a week before December 25, 
after e was surprised to learn that the project was unfinished, 
and Mr. English was told by the Defendant that the project was 95 
to 99 percei I t compi e te Mr. English asked wheher he should advise 
Messrs. Broadhead or Loudon that the auto switchover was partially 
inoperable, but Defendant reassured Mr. English tt lat the computer 
room iii»irid(|oiiieiit wnnOlil t»e informed that the switchover would not 
work during power outages. Defendant never explained to computer 
room managment that t he switchover would not wor k di lr i ng power 
oi itages. Mr Loudon relied on the informal conversation with 
Defendant concerning the progress of the air conditioning project 
just as he had for many years prior to December 1991. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's evidence of damages was not so imprecise that the 
jury would have been required to speculate oi cjuess. P] ai riti ff 
offered sul f icient evidence that Plaintiff incurred $134,900.00 in 
damages and $1,606.96 for service work to replace the nine HDAs 
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destroyed from high-heat on December 25, 1991. Indeed, Plaintiff's 
evidence was that it saved $100,000 by ordering seven of the 
newest-model HDAs to replace the nine destroyed HDAs. 
Plaintiff relied on the accuracy of Defendant's representation 
that the automatic switchover was fully operational. Plaintiff's 
reliance was probable and reasonably foreseeable. Plaintiff had 
relied on Defendant's statements concerning service and maintenance 
work for many years before December 25, 1991. Defendant knew that 
Plaintiff did not have any expertise in air conditioning. 
Defendant was expected to make representations in accordance with 
the degree of care and skill expected of a commercial air 
conditioning contractor. Defendant knew that Plaintiff did not 
understand that the auto switchover was fully operable a week 
before December 25, 1991, yet assured Plaintiff that Defendant 
would keep the computer room management informed of the progress of 
the work. 
When Plaintiff's evidence of damages and reliance on 
Defendant's negligent misrepresentation is examined, in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiff, the directed verdict was improperly 
granted. Plaintiff raised questions of material fact, no matter 
how improbable, that should have been considered by the jury. 
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THEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the directed 
verdict be reversed and this action \iv remanded for trial. 
(S DATED this \J> day of May, 1996. 
J J^Angus Edwards 
PURSER EDWARDS & SHIELDS, L.L.C. 
800 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2340 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to 
be served upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in the 
United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
John L. Young 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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JOHN L. YOUNG [A3591] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
; f 
ALTA HEALTH STRATEGIES, INC., 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CCI MECHANICAL SERVICE, a 
Division of CCI Mechanical, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER DIRECTING 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 
Civil No. 930903151PP 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, 
on August 7, 1995, said matter being tried to a jury, duly chosen and seated in accordance with 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff, Alta Health Strategies was represented by J. Angus 
Edwards of Purser & Edwards; the defendant, CCI Mechanical Service was represented by John 
L. Young of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. 
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Upon the conclusion of the plaintiffs case on August 8, 1995, the defendant made 
a motion for directed verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 
The Court, having considered the defendant's motion, the evidence presented by 
the plaintiff, the pleadings and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directed 
Verdict. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. As of December 25, 1991, CCI Mechanical Service [HCCIM] was 
constructing and installing certain alterations on the air conditioning system and equipment at 
the Alta Health Strategies, Inc. ["Alta Health"] computer facility pursuant to a written contract. 
2. On December 25, 1991, between the hour of 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., 
an event occurred at the Alta Health computer facility causing the air conditioning system to 
stop. 
3. Russell Loudon, an employee of Alta Health, was the manager of the 
Computer Operations Center, charged with overseeing all computer operations for Alta Health. 
He entered the computer room sometime between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., on December 25, 
1991, and discovered that the temperature in the computer room had reached 95° fahrenheit. 
4. Upon subsequent evaluation of the computer room equipment, Alta Health 
and Unisys, Inc., the computer equipment supplier and maintenance contractor, determined that 
five to seven head disk assemblies [MHDAV] required replacement. 
5. The HDA's requiring replacement were all associated with the Unisys 
Model 9494-24 unit. 
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6. The Model 9494-24 HDA's requiring replacement were not replaced by 
Alta Ikalili .ind Unisys with the same model, but were replaced with new model 9730 Unisys 
units. 
7. The quoted replacement cost by Unisys for the Unisys model 9494-24 
HDA was $19,300.00 per unit. 
8 The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence as to whether the Unisys 
replacement price of $19,300.00 for each Model 9494-24 HDA \v;i\ a "reasonable price." 
9. In the transaction for replacement of the Model 9494-24 units with the new 
Unisys Model 9730 \iitits, Unisys graiited unspecified price concessions for the conversion to the 
new Model 9730 units. 
10. : n? * no evidence as to the extent or amount of the price 
concessions given to Alta Health for the conversion to the Model 9730 units. 
rhe plaintiff introduced no evidence establishing that Alta Health ever paid 
any amount for the replacement of the 9494-24 HDA's allegedly damaged on December 25, 
1991, with the new Model 9730 units. 
12. The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence as to the age of the 9494-24 
HDA's that were damaged on December 25, 1991; failed to establish the date that such HDA's 
were placed into service; failed to IIIIIUMIIKT anv in'idnuT tli.il such HDA's vine noil exposed 
to environmental contamination, admittedly present in the Alta Health computer facility during 
Ihr )'VM IW1, .nn* tailed In i.ifhM'luu .my rudeiki" as It* the fair market value of the Model 
9494-24 HDA's immediately before the incident, that were replaced with the new Model 9730 
Units. 
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13. The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence as to the difference in fair 
market value between the Unisys Model 9494-24 HDA's damaged and the fair market value of 
the Model 9730 HDA's that replaced the 9494-24 HDA's. 
14. The air conditioning system at the Alta Health Computer facility was not 
serviced by any auxiliary power supply. The sole power supply was from the main public utility 
service. 
15. The Alta Health computer system was supplied with electrical power by 
the main public utility service and with an auxiliary "uninterrupted power supply" ["UPS"] 
system, which provided electrical power in the event of a main power supply failure. 
16. As of December 25, 1991, Alta Health employees knew that the air 
conditioning system was not serviced by any alternative power source. 
17. Prior to December 25, 1991, and subsequent to December 25, 1991, Alta 
Health manned the computer room facility 24-hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. 
18. Part of the work being performed by CCI at Alta Health as of December 
25, 1991, included the modification and alteration of an "automatic switching system" that would 
allow the air conditioning system to automatically restart when the main electrical power was 
restored following a main electrical power outage. Russell Loudon and Kent Broadhead, Alta 
Health employees, knew that the air conditioning contract work being performed by CCI was 
incomplete on December 25, 1991. 
19. Although Russell Loudon testified that he "understood" from a 
conversation with a CCI employee, either Greg Porter or George Murdoch, that the automatic 
switching system was operational as of December 25, 1991, he knew that the new electrical 
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control panel, with the air conditioning system indicator lights, was not installed. Prior to 
December 25, 1991, Russell Loudon did not inquire of any CCI employee regarding how the 
system would indicate that the automatic switching mechanism was working, or how the new 
system would work, or what the computer operators were to do regarding monitoring the new 
system, except that he knew there would be new indicator lights on the new electrical control 
panel when it was installed that would indicate which chillers were working. 
20. The automatic switching system was not operational as of December 25, 
1991. 
21. Kent Broadhead and Russell Loudon decided to leave the Alta Health 
computer facility unmanned on December 25, 1991, with employees only periodically checking 
on the system. 
22. Alta Health failed to introduce any evidence that Kent Broadhead had any 
conversations with any CCI employee to determine whether the automatic switching mechanism 
was operational as of December 25, 1991. 
23. As of December 25, 1991, Kent Broadhead and Russell Loudon, 
employees of Alta Health, knew that electrical power outage, the 
computer system would be powered for 30-45 minutes by an alternative power source from the 
UPS system. 
24. As of December 25, 1991, Kent Broadhead knew that in the event a main 
electrica1 power failure occurred and r system power system was consumed, the multi-
million dollar Alta Health Computer System would sustain a catastrophic failure. 
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25. Alta Health introduced no evidence to establish reasonable reliance to 
support its "understanding" that the automatic switch-over mechanism was complete as of 
December 25, 1991, or that such "understanding" could justify leaving the Alta Health Computer 
Center unattended on December 25, 1991. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters its conclusions of 
law. 
1. The plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could determine the damages, if any, that the plaintiff allegedly sustained. 
2. The plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find 
that the plaintiff had "reasonably relied" upon any negligent misrepresentation allegedly made 
by the defendant. 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
The Court, based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
hereby directs that a verdict be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, no 
cause of action. The defendant is awarded its costs incurred herein, and shall submit an 
Affidavit of Costs, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 3 day of N ^ v ^ r ^ e ^ , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
M 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY tbt& z true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was hand 
delivered, this $-£ day of HdWlMfiLwA 1995, to the following: 
' J . Angus Edwards, Esq. 
800 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
